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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL 82, NEW YORK STATE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS UNION, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5860 
TOWN OF CAIRO, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Intervenor/lncumbent.1 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Council 82, New York State Law 
Enforcement Officers Union, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by 
1
 During the processing of this petition, United Public Service Employees Union 
disclaimed any and all interest in representing the unit. 
Certification - C-5860 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All police officers employed by the Town of Cairo except the Chief 
of Police. 
Excluded: All other titles. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Council 82, New York State Law Enforcement Officers 
Union, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lef/owitz,>0hairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. G6le, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT COMMANDING OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5825 
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police 
Department Commanding Officers Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be 
appropriate and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: Captain, Captain Commander, Deputy Inspector, Inspector and 
Assistant Deputy Chief. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department 
Commanding Officers Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
y/*e»*(_ -
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chamnan 
stf/ 
Robert S. Rite, Member 
£2— 
Sheila S^ Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 529, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5836 
TOWN OF URBAN A, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, • 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America Local No. 529 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
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gnevances. 
Included: 
Excluded: 
All full-time, part-time and seasonal employees employed in the 
Town's Highway Department, including the Deputy Highway 
Superintendent, all Heavy Motor Equipment Operators, Motor 
Equipment Operator/Mechanics, Town Maintenance Workers, 
Laborers and all other employees performing such work in the 
Town's Highway Department. 
All elected officials, managerial employees, confidential employees, 
casual employees, and all other employee of the Town. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America Local No. 529. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
jA#yn4^-
Jerome Lefkowitzf Chain 
Robert S. Flite, Member 
u^a^ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ADIRONDACK COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5866 
ADIRONDACK COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Adirondack Community College Faculty 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time employees of the College in the academic rank of 
Instructor, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, Professor, 
Distinguished Professor, Technical Instructor, Assistant Instructor, 
part-time employees entitled Special Adjunct, full-time non-credit 
faculty, and adjuncts that are scheduled to teach at least one three-
credit course in a semester. 
Excluded: Adjuncts that are scheduled to teach less than one three-credit 
course in a semester, part-time Librarians, Clinical Instructors, Non-
Faculty Coaches, Technicians, Tutors, Lab Assistants, Lab 
Supervisors, Lab Coordinators, Radio Manager, Private Music 
Instructors, confidential employees, managerial employees and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Adirondack Community College Faculty Association. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
S Sheila S. Col6, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROLAND BLOWE and LYNOX WATSON, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-28448 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL 
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1597, 
Respondent, 
-and-
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
ROLAND BLOWE, for Charging Parties 
MARY J. O'CONNELL, GENERAL COUNSEL (MEAGHEAN MURPHY of 
counsel), for Respondent 
FREDERICK P. SCHAFFER, GENERAL COUNSEL AND VICE CHANCELLOR 
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS (DANIEL R. SIMONETTE of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Roland Blowe (Blowe) and 
Lynox Watson (Watson) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing 
an improper practice charge filed on June 30, 2008, as amended, alleging that District 
Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 
Local 1597 (DC 37), violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
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(Act) when DC 37 did not process a grievance to arbitration challenging their termination 
by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge, concluding 
that the charging parties had failed to prove that DC 37 had breached its duty of fair 
representation, in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act, by engaging in arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad faith conduct when it refused to process their grievance to 
arbitration following a merits review of the grievance by a DC 37 attorney. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In their exceptions, Blowe and Watson contend that the ALJ erred in crediting the 
testimony of the DC 37 attorney with respect to her conclusions stemming from her 
investigation into the merits of their grievance. In addition, they except to the ALJ's 
conclusion that their contractual interpretation of the agreement is not the only possible 
correct construction. Both DC 37 and CUNY support the decision of the ALJ. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated here only 
as they relate to the exceptions filed. 
Blowe and Watson were hired by CUNY in February 2006 to work at Medgar Evers 
College as part-time hourly custodial assistants and were terminated from their positions 
in August 2007. DC 37 assisted Blowe and Watson in filing a grievance and it processed 
the grievance at Step I and II of the grievance procedure in the 2002-2006 collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement), known as the Blue Collar Contract. The grievance 
1
 42 PERB 1J4507 (2009). 
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asserted that the terminations violated the negotiated disciplinary procedures of the 
agreement, CUNY's bylaws and a provision of the Education Law.2 At both steps, CUNY 
denied the grievance, concluding that Blowe and Watson, as hourly part-time custodial 
assistants, do not have disciplinary procedural rights under the agreement or the other 
sources of right cited on their behalf. 
Following CUNY's denial of the grievance, DC 37 assigned Senior Assistant 
General Counsel Robin Roach (Roach) to render a merits-based recommendation with 
respect to whether the grievance should be processed to arbitration.3 It is undisputed 
that, as part of her review, Roach examined both the agreement and Appendix B to the 
agreement with respect to custodial assistants and she consulted with Senior Assistant 
Director of Research and Negotiations David Paskin (Paskin), DC 37's negotiator with 
CUNY. She learned that the custodial assistant'position was a successor title to another 
title from a different unit that did not have disciplinary procedural protections. She also 
learned that the negotiated due process rights granted to custodial assistants in Appendix 
B of the agreement were intended, by both CUNY and DC 37, to be limited to full-time 
employees in that title. Finally, she examined the definition of a grievance under the 
agreement to determine whether an alleged violation of the Education Law is grievable. 
Based upon the information gathered during her review, Roach prepared a 
memorandum recommending that the grievance not proceed to arbitration. In the 
memorandum, Roach concluded that based upon the relevant negotiation history, it was 
highly unlikely that DC 37 would be able to establish that the parties to the agreement 
2EducLaw§6210. 
3
 Step III is the final step of the grievance procedure under the agreement and provides, 
in relevant part, that only DC 37 can file for arbitration from an unsatisfactory Step II 
grievance decision. Respondent Exhibit 2, Article XXVI, §3. 
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intended hourly part-time custodial assistants to be entitled to the negotiated disciplinary 
procedures. In addition, she concluded that an alleged violation of the Education Law was 
not grievable. Based upon Roach's recommendation, DC 37 did not process the 
grievance to arbitration. 
DISCUSSION 
In order to establish a violation of the duty of fair representation under the Act, 
Blowe and Watson have the burden of proving that DC 37's decision not to proceed to 
arbitration is arbitrary, discriminatory or founded in bad faith.4 
It is well settled under the Act that an employee organization is entitled to a wide 
range of reasonable discretion in the processing of grievances under the Act.5 In the 
present case, DC 37 prepared and processed the grievance at Step I and II of the 
negotiated grievance procedure. It made its determination not to proceed to arbitration at 
Step III only after one of its attorneys, Roach, reviewed the applicable provisions of the 
agreement and Appendix B, and also examined the relevant negotiations history. 
Following her review and research, Roach recommended, based upon the merits of the 
grievance, that it should not proceed to arbitration. 
With respect to the exceptions by Blowe and Watson, we find no basis in the 
record for disturbing the ALJ's crediting of Roach's unrebutted testimony. In addition, the 
record does not include any evidence demonstrating that DC 37 acted in bad faith or that 
4
 CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dept 
1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB1J7017 (1988). 
5
 District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB 1J3062 (1995); PEF (Frisch), 29 
PERB P019 (1996); Rochester Teachers Assn (Danna), 41 PERB H3003 (2008); District 
Council 37, AFSCME Maltev),4\ PERB 1J3022 (2008). 
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the contract interpretation presented by Blowe and Watson constitutes the "only possible" 
one.6 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Blowe's and Watson's exceptions and affirm 
the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, dismissed 
in its entirety.7 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cofe, Member 
6Hauppauge Schools Office Staff Assn, 18 PERB1J3029 (1985). 
7
 Board Member Hite took no part. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DR. SIMPSON GRAY, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28282 
- and -
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 
2, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
DR. SIMPSON GRAY, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (WENDY M. STAR of counsel), 
for Respondent United Federation of Teachers 
ROBERT E. WATERS, ESQ. (KELLIE TERESE WALKER of counsel), for 
Employer Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New 
York 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Dr. Simpson Gray (Gray) to 
a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge filed by Gray on April 11, 2008, as amended, alleging that the United Federation 
of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT) violated §209-
a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge based 
upon Gray's failure to prosecute the charge by not presenting any evidence at the 
hearing following his opening statement. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Gray contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing his charge on 
the grounds that §212.4(b) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) is unconstitutional, 
overbroad, vague and invalid. In addition, he asserts that the Board exceeded its 
authority in promulgating §212.4(b) of the Rules and that the ALJ misapplied the Rule in 
dismissing the charge. Both the UFT and the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (District) support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Gray's charge alleges that the UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act because only 
two of the fifteen grievances he filed since 2006 have been heard, and decisions have 
not been issued with respect to those two grievances. After the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) informed him that his charge was 
deficient, Gray filed an amended pleading, which set forth specific allegations against 
the UFT, sought to add the District as a named respondent, and alleged that the District 
violated §§202 and 209-a.1(a), (c) and (d) of the Act. 
In May 2008, a pre-hearing conference was scheduled before an ALJ with the 
notice informing Gray that the allegations against the, District in his amended pleading 
would not be processed. Both the UFT and the District filed answers to Gray's 
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amended charge. Prior to the scheduled conference, Gray filed a second amended 
pleading, which an ALJ ruled was deficient and, therefore, would not be processed. 
In June 2008, a notice was sent to the parties scheduling an evidentiary hearing 
on Gray's amended charge for October 7, 2008. In July 2008, Gray filed a motion with 
the Board, pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules, seeking leave to file exceptions 
challenging the pre-hearing ruling that his second amended pleading was deficient. On 
September 24, 2008, the Board issued a decision denying Gray's motion for leave.1 
One day prior to the scheduled October 7, 2008 hearing, Gray requested an 
adjournment, which the ALJ granted, and the hearing was rescheduled for November 25, 
2008 with the ALJ advising the parties that no further adjournments would be granted. 
On October 17, 2008, Gray commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking judicial 
review of the Board's decision denying him leave to file exceptions and seeking to enjoin 
the November 25, 2008 hearing before the ALJ. Following oral argument, Supreme 
Court Justice Alice Schlesinger issued an order and judgment denying Gray's request 
for injunctive relief and granting PERB's cross-motion to dismiss the Article 78 
proceeding.2 
On October 28, 2008, Gray filed a request with the ALJ seeking issuance of 
subpoenas for seven witnesses to testify on his behalf at the November 25, 2008 
hearing. In support of his application, Gray stated only that the testimony of the 
1
 UFT (Gray), 41 PERB 1J3025 (2008). 
2
 Gray v New York Pub Empl Rel Bd, 41 PERB 1J7006 (2008). Gray has served a notice 
of appeal from the order and judgment. At the same time, Gray has pursued other 
litigation against the District. See, Gray v City of New York, 19 Misc3d 1117(A) (Sup Ct 
NY County 2008), affd, 58 AD3d 448 (1s t Dept 2009), Ivden, 12 NY3d 802 (2009). 
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witnesses is necessary and that the witnesses would not appear voluntarily. On 
November 6, 2008, the ALJ issued a written ruling denying Gray's request for 
subpoenas, which was mailed and faxed to the parties. The ruling stated that Gray's 
request was denied because he had failed to set forth facts establishing the relevancy 
of the testimony to be adduced consistent with §211.3(b)(2) of the Rules. In her ruling, 
however, the ALJ explained that Gray would have the opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses called by a respondent. The day after the ALJ's ruling, Gray served and filed 
a motion by regular mail and fax requesting that the ALJ disqualify herself based upon 
her ruling denying his subpoena requests. Both the UFT and the District opposed 
Gray's motion and the ALJ notified the parties that she would address Gray's 
disqualification motion at the scheduled hearing. 
At the commencement of the November 25, 2008 hearing, the ALJ denied 
Gray's disqualification motion on the record and requested that Gray proceed with an 
opening statement. During his opening statement, rather than state what he intended 
to prove, Gray renewed his disqualification motion, requested another adjournment of 
the hearing, renewed his request for subpoenas and declined the opportunity to testify 
on his own behalf. After Gray rested without presenting any evidence, the UFT and the 
District moved to dismiss the charge. 
DISCUSSION 
Gray's exceptions challenge the legality of §212.4(b) of the Rules, which states: 
The hearing will not be adjourned unless good and 
sufficient grounds are established by the requesting 
party, who shall file with the administrative law judge 
an original and three copies of the application, on 
notice to all other parties, setting forth the factual 
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circumstances of the application and the previously 
ascertained position of the other parties to the 
application. The failure of a party to appear at the 
hearing may, in the discretion of the administrative 
law judge, constitute ground for dismissal of the 
absent party's pleading. 
In addition, he asserts that the ALJ misapplied the Rule in dismissing the charge.3 
It is well-settled that the failure of a charging party to prosecute a charge 
constitutes grounds for dismissal.4 In the present case, the ALJ's dismissal of the 
charge for failure to prosecute was based on Gray's calculated decision at the hearing 
to rest, following his opening statement, without presenting any evidence in support of 
the charge. The dismissal was not premised on Gray's failure to attend the hearing, 
pursuant to §212.4(b) of the Rules, but his failure to prove his case. Therefore, Gray's 
assertion that the ALJ misapplied §212.4(b) lacks any merit. Furthermore, Gray lacks 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Rule because his charge was 
dismissed based upon a failure of proof; the dismissal was not due to an absence at 
3
 Gray has not filed exceptions challenging any of the ALJ's procedural rulings including 
the rejection of his second amended pleading, the denial of his request for issuance of 
subpoenas, the denial of his request for a second adjournment and the denial of his 
motion for disqualification. Therefore, they are waived. PERB's Rules, §213.2(b)(4); 
Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007), confirmed sub nom. Town of 
Orangetown v New York State Pub EmpiRel Bd, 40 PERB 1J7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 
2007); County of Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 PERB 1J3006 (2008); Town of 
Wallkill, 42 PERB 1J3006 (2009). Based upon our review of the record, however, we 
would affirm each of the ALJ's procedural rulings because they are fully consistent with 
our Rules and applicable Board precedent. 
4
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 16 PERB 1J3067 (1983); 
Smithtown Fire Dist, 28 PERB Tf3060 (1995); IBT, Local 237 (Jouldach), 34 PERB 
P010(2001). 
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the hearing.5 ] . 
Alternatively, Gray's contention that §212.4(b) of the Rules violates due process 
is equally without any merit. The Rule provides parties with notice and an opportunity to 
be heard, the two essential elements of due process, with respect to a request for an 
adjournment.6 The fact that an ALJ is granted discretion with respect to a requested 
adjournment does not violate due process nor does it render the applicable Rule 
overbroad, vague and invalid.7 Similarly, the principles of due process do not prohibit a 
procedural rule that grants discretion to an ALJ to dismiss a charge when a charging 
party, after receiving notice and an opportunity to be heard, fails to appear at a hearing 
or chooses not to present evidence at the hearing.8 Furthermore, if an ALJ abuses her 
or his discretion, it can be reviewed through exceptions to the Board. 
Finally, we reject Gray's argument that PERB exceeded its authority in 
promulgating §212.4(b) of the Rules. Pursuant to §§205.5(d) and (I) of the Act, the 
Board is fully authorized to promulgate rules and regulations establishing the 
procedures with respect to improper public employer and employee organization 
practices. 
5
 See generally, New York State Assn of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207 
(2004). 
6
 See generally, Board of Regents vRoth, 408 US 564 (1972). 
7
 See, Mera v Tax Appeals Tribunal of State of NY, 204 AD2d 818 (3d Dept 1994); 
Frederick G. v New York State Cent Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment, 53 
AD3d 1075 (4th Dept 2008). 
8
 See, PortJervis Teachers Assn (McAndrew), 22 PERB P021 (1989), confirmed sub 
nom. McAndrew v Newman, 22 PERB U7021 (Sup Ct Orange County 1989). 
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Based upon the foregoing, we deny Gray's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
theALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
^ Sheila S. Cffle, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANDREA STASKOWSKI, 
Charging Party, 
CASENO.U-26135 
-and-
NASSAU COMMUNITY COLLEGE FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 3150, NEW YORK STATE 
UNITED TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- a n d -
NASSAU COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
WOLIN & WOLIN (ALAN E. WOLIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
CHARLES D. MAURER, for Respondent 
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P. (ANNA M. SCRICCA of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Dr. Andrea Staskowski 
(Staskowski) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper 
practice charge, as amended and clarified, alleging that the Nassau Community College 
Federation of Teachers, Local 3150, New York State United Teachers, AFL-CIO 
(Federation) violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
Case No. U-26135 2 
(Act) based upon the Federation's refusal to abide by Staskowski's request to bypass 
Step II of the contract grievance procedure when processing a grievance challenging her 
suspension by Nassau Community College (College) and based upon the Federation's 
representation of her at a May 12, 2005 pre-hearing meeting with respect to the College's 
charges seeking to dismiss Staskowski from her tenured position. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In her exceptions, Staskowski asserts that the ALJ erred in dismissing her charge 
at the conclusion of her case in chief, contending that she presented sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate a prima facie case that the Federation breached its duty of fair 
representation under the Act. The Federation and the College support the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The College and Federation are parties to a September 1, 2000-August 31, 2005 
collectively negotiated agreement (agreement). The negotiated grievance procedure 
contains five steps. A grievance may be filed within 90 days of the date of the alleged 
grievance. At Step II, the written grievance is heard by the College President or his/her 
designee, and Step III is heard by a tripartite Grievance Board. If either the grievant or 
Federation is dissatisfied with the Grievance Board's decision, it can be appealed to 
advisory arbitration at Step IV. Finally, at Step V, an appeal from an advisory 
arbitrator's decision is determined by the County Executive. 
The agreement also contains a negotiated tenure dismissal procedure. Under 
the tenure dismissal procedure, following an investigation, a formal dismissal 
proceeding can be commenced against a faculty member through the issuance of a 
finding of probable cause containing the disciplinary charges. After a faculty member 
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receives the charges and requests a hearing, the President notifies the Promotion and 
Tenure (P & T) Committee, composed of nine elected faculty members, that a hearing is 
required. Under the agreement, these nine faculty members serve as the Hearing 
Committee (Committee) in a tenure dismissal case with the responsibility of determining 
if "adequate and just cause exists to recommend the dismissal of a faculty member." 
The agreement outlines a pre-hearing procedure aimed at expediting the hearing 
process: 
The Committee may, with the consent of the parties 
concerned, hold joint pre-hearing meetings in order to 
simplify the issues, effect stipulation of facts, provide for 
exchange of documentary or other information and achieve 
such other appropriate pre-hearing objectives as to make the 
hearing fair, effective and expeditious, or reach settlement.1 
In addition, the agreement outlines the applicable hearing procedures in a tenure 
dismissal proceeding. 
Staskowski has been a faculty member in the College's Communications 
Department since 1996. She was appointed Assistant Professor and granted tenure by 
the College in 2001. 
According to Staskowski's testimony, following her election to the Federation's 
Executive Board (Board) in 1997, she began to publicly question, on a regular basis, the 
Federation's leadership over various issues including the structure of the negotiated pay 
scale, the Federation's use of travel money and the collection and utilization of political 
action funds. She testified that she regularly raised these issues at Board and 
membership meetings. In 2004, she supported a candidate in a special Federation 
1
 Joint Exhibit 1, §47-5.2. 
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election who Staskowski describes as being an outsider to the Federation leadership. 
These activities were known to Federation President Frances Hilliard (Hilliard) and other 
Federation officials. 
After four absences from class in September 2004, Staskowski received a letter 
from Vice President for Academic Affairs John C. Ostling (Ostling) counseling her about 
alleged inappropriate absenteeism and informing her that if her attendance did not 
improve the College may commence the tenure dismissal procedure against her. 
During a meeting with Federation representatives on September 30, 2004, Staskowski 
was informed that Ostling's counseling letter was not grievable. The following day, 
Staskowski received another letter from Ostling informing her that the College was 
suspending her with pay from her responsibilities and barring her from entering the 
College campus without authorization. After receiving the suspension letter, Staskowski 
discussed it with Hilliard who discouraged her from filing an immediate grievance 
because Staskowski had 90 days to file under the agreement. 
In November 2004, following an investigation, Dean Muth (Muth) submitted to 
College President Sean A. Fanelli (Fanelli) a report recommending the commencement 
of a formal proceeding seeking to dismiss Staskowski for excessive absences in 2004 
and other alleged misconduct in 2001 and 2002. On November 22, 2004, Staskowski 
received the finding of probable cause from Fanelli. One week later, she met with 
Federation representatives and filed a grievance alleging that the College violated the 
agreement when it suspended her and barred her from campus without authorization. 
The Federation filed the grievance at Step II on November 30, 2004. 
In December 2004 and February 2005, Staskowski met with a New York State 
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United Teachers (NYSUT) attorney assigned, on behalf of the Federation, to represent 
her in defending against the tenure dismissal proceeding. 
By letter dated March 17, 2005, the Federation notified Staskowski that on 
April 12, 2005, the Step II hearing on her grievance would take place before Fanelli's 
designee, Director of Governmental Affairs Chuck Cutolo (Cutolo).2 The letter also 
confirmed that Staskowski would meet with Federation representatives on March 28, 
2005 to prepare for the Step II hearing. Finally, the Federation informed Staskowski 
that the tenure dismissal charges against her would be officially presented to the P & 
T Committee on March 30, 2005. 
Following the March 28, 2005 preparatory meeting, Staskowski wrote to Hilliard 
objecting to the Federation's handling of the grievance. In her letter, Staskowski 
questioned the neutrality of the Step II procedure because a designee of Fanelli would 
be hearing the grievance. She also questioned the propriety of proceeding with a Step 
II hearing based on her claim that the College violated the agreement by failing to 
schedule the Step II hearing within ten working days after receipt of the grievance. 
Furthermore, Staskowski expressed her disagreement with the Federation's strategic 
advice to proceed with Step II as a means to flesh out the College's evidence and 
rationale for its adverse actions against her. Finally, Staskowski rejected the 
Federation's analysis that the grievance challenging her suspension was distinct from 
her defense in opposition to the charges seeking her termination. 
On April 5, 2005, the Federation responded by letter to Staskowski informing her 
2
 Charging Party Exhibit 27. As the result of the Federation's advocacy, Muth was 
replaced by Cutolo as the Step II hearing officer. Charging Party Exhibits 10 and 27; 
Transcript, p. 55. 
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that the Federation's Executive Board met to discuss her concerns about the grievance 
and informed her that if she was dissatisfied with the Federation's representation she 
was entitled to retain her own personal attorney.3 In response, Staskowski sent 
separate but similar letters to NYSUT's General Counsel and the Northeast Regional 
Office of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) complaining about the 
Federation's handling of her grievance as well as the Federation's settlement efforts on 
her behalf. On April 19, 2005, Staskowski notified the Federation that she no longer 
wanted its representation. Step II hearing officer Cutolo issued a decision denying her 
grievance on April 27, 2005. 
In the meantime, a pre-hearing meeting with respect to the tenure dismissal 
charges was scheduled for May 12, 2005. On April 15, 2005, the College's Vice 
President for Legal and External Affairs Anna Mascolo (Mascolo) sent a memorandum 
to Dr. Carol Mottola (Mottola), the P & T Committee's Chairperson, stating: 
This is to confirm that a meeting is scheduled for Thursday, 
May 12, 2005, at 1:00 p.m., in CCB 210. This meeting is 
being held under the terms of Article 47-5.2 of the NCCFT 
Collective Bargaining Agreement.4 
During her testimony, Staskowski stated that the memorandum demonstrates 
that Mascolo, rather than the P & T Committee, scheduled the pre-hearing meeting in 
violation of the agreement. 
3
 Charging Party Exhibit 11. During the same period, Staskowski communicated with 
the NYSUT attorney assigned to represent her in the tenure dismissal proceeding about 
her dissatisfaction with the Federation's representation. Charging Party Exhibits 12 and 
13. 
4
 Charging Party Exhibit 21. The memorandum indicates that various College 
representatives and Federation President Hilliard were sent copies of the memorandum. 
However, Staskowski was not sent the memorandum. 
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The pre-hearing meeting took place on May 12, 2005 with the following 
individuals in attendance: members of the P & T Committee, the College's attorney, 
Staskowski, the NYSUT attorney assigned to represent Staskowski and Federation 
officers. According to Staskowski's testimony, the College's attorney conducted the 
meeting and dictated the hearing procedures that would be followed. Staskowski 
testified that at the meeting, the NYSUT attorney passively agreed to the procedures 
outlined by the College's attorney. 
On May 25, 2005, the College's attorney sent a letter to Mottola memorializing 
the agreement, reached at the May 12, 2005 pre-hearing meeting, with respect to the 
hearing dates as well as the procedural rules with respect to evidentiary objections, 
questioning of witnesses, attendance by P & T Committee members at the hearing and 
cancellations. 
.) 
On June 3, 2005, Staskowski sent a letter to NYSUT's General Counsel raising 
various procedural objections with respect to the scheduling and conduct of the May 12, 
2005 meeting. In addition, Staskowski criticized the representation she had received 
from NYSUT's assigned attorney and requested the reassignment of her case to 
another NYSUT attorney. 
DISCUSSION 
The Board will affirm an ALJ's decision to grant a motion to dismiss an improper 
practice charge at the close of the charging party's case when the charging party's 
evidence in the record, after granting all reasonable inferences, is plainly insufficient to 
J 
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warrant a finding that the charge should be sustained.5 It is well-settled that a charging 
party has the burden of proof to establish that an employee organization acted in a 
manner that was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith in order to establish a breach of 
the duty of fair representation.6 
In the present case, Staskowski argues that she presented sufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case of a breach of the duty of fair representation, which shifted 
the burden of persuasion to the Federation to present evidence. Following our 
examination of the record, and after granting all reasonable inferences to Staskowski's 
evidence as we must, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charge. 
Contrary to Staskowski's claim, we find that she failed to establish a prima facie 
case that the Federation acted in an arbitrary manner by denying her request to bypass 
Step II. An employee organization is entitled to a wide range of reasonable discretion in 
the processing of a grievance under the Act and the Federation's decision to proceed 
with the Step II hearing is well within such discretion.7 The fact that a grievance must 
be presented by the grievant within ten working days after the filing at Step II and that 
the College President designates the Step II hearing officer does not establish that the 
Federation acted arbitrarily in proceeding with the Step II hearing. Similarly, 
Staskowski's disagreement with the Federation's articulated strategy does'not constitute 
5
 See, County of Nassau (Police Dept), 17 PERB H3013 (1984); Board of Educ of the 
City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo, 24 PERB 1J3033 (1991); Professional Staff Congress 
(Veira), 23 PERB 1J3030 (1990); UFT (Ayazi), 32 PERB H3069 (1999); UFT (Fearon), 37 
PERB 1J3029 (2004); UFT (Saidin) 40 PERB P003 (2007). 
6
 UFT (Saidin), 36 PERB 1J3042 (2003); TWU Local 100 (Brockington), 37 PERB 1J3002 
(2004); AFSCME Council 66, Local 3933 (Altieri), 39 PERB fl3015 (2006); UFT 
(Jenkins) 41 PERB H3007 (2008), confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, 41 PERB 1J7007 (Sup Ct NY County 2008) nor. 
7
 UFT (Jenkins); supra note 5. 
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evidence of a breach of the Federation's duty. 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the Federation's handling of the 
May 12, 2005 pre-hearing meeting. Contrary to Staskowski's argument, the failure of 
the Federation to object to the fact that Mascolo sent a memorandum to Mottola 
confirming the date for the pre-hearing conference does not establish collusion or 
arbitrariness by the Federation. Furthermore, Staskowski's description of the meeting is 
insufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of arbitrary conduct by the Federation. 
The purpose of the meeting was for the parties to resolve preliminary issues including 
scheduling the hearing and the procedures to be following during the hearing. The 
letter from the College's attorney, introduced into evidence by Staskowski and relied 
upon in support of her exceptions, clearly demonstrates that at the pre-hearing meeting 
the parties entered into various procedural stipulations aimed at expediting the hearing 
consistent with the terms of the agreement. Contrary to her argument, the evidence in 
the record does not establish that the Federation colluded with the College in violating 
the agreement or that there was a violation of the agreement in the conduct of the 
meeting. 
We next turn to Staskowski's distinct claim that the Federation's refusal to 
bypass Step II and its conduct during the pre-hearing meeting were discriminatory or in 
bad faith. Granting Staskowski all reasonable inferences, we find that for purposes of 
establishing a prima facie case, the record includes evidence to suggest a possible 
improper motivation behind the Federation's actions and omissions. During her 
testimony, Staskowski described conduct which, if true, can be fairly described as 
dissident behavior toward the Federation's leadership, and her conduct was known by 
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Hilliard and other Federation officials. However, Staskowski failed to present any 
evidence, such as temporal proximity or disparate treatment, to suggest a causal 
connection between her activities and the Federation's actions to establish a prima facie 
case. In fact, her evidence establishes that since her suspension and the 
commencement of the tenure dismissal procedure in 2004, the Federation has 
consistently provided her with representation with respect to her grievance and the 
tenure dismissal proceeding. A reasonable inference can not be drawn from the 
evidence in the record that Staskowski's dissatisfaction with that representation, and her 
disagreement with the Federation's interpretation of the agreement, demonstrate a 
causal link necessary to establish a prima facie case of the breach of the duty of fair 
representation. Staskowski's conclusory assertion of such a causal relationship does 
not constitute probative evidence. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Staskowski's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
sd^&?H<^ „,,,. 
// Jerome Lefkowitz, 'Chakrfian 
' R o b e r t ' s . Hife,'Member 
\2li^J<2. 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GEORGE ROWE, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-26736 
- and -
1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, 
Respondent, 
- and -
COUNTY OF ALBANY, 
Employer. 
GEORGE ROWE, pro se 
LEVY RATNER, P.C. (DAVID SLUTSKY and DANA E. LOSSIA 
of counsel), for Respondent 
KRISTINA A. BURNS, GENERAL COUNSEL (CHRISTINE C. KELLY of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by George Rowe (Rowe) to a 
decision by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) dismissing an improper practice charge filed by Rowe on April 24, 
2006, as amended, alleging that 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (1199 
SEIU) breached its duty of fair representation in violation of §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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1199 SEIU filed an answer asserting that it has consistently and fairly 
represented Rowe and raising various affirmative defenses, including the timeliness of 
certain allegations in the charge. 
Prior to the scheduling of the hearing, the Assistant Director directed Rowe to 
submit a written submission clarifying his allegations by setting forth each specific 
violation of the Act by 1199 SEIU, including the date of each occurrence and the names 
of the individuals involved in the alleged improper practice. In response, Rowe 
submitted a letter, dated December 8, 2006, setting forth various alleged acts by 1199 
SEIU between February 2003 and June 2006. Following the Assistant Director's review 
of Rowe's written clarification, she notified the parties that the charge would be 
processed to hearing with respect to 1199 SEIU's alleged failure to fulfill a promise to 
Rowe to hold a meeting to examine the disciplinary action taken against him by his 
employer, the Albany County Nursing Home (Nursing Home), and 1199 SEIU's alleged 
failure to respond to Rowe's telephone calls on specific dates between February 23, 
2006 and June 7, 2006. 
At the close of Rowe's case during the hearing, the Assistant Director granted 
1199 SEIU's motion to dismiss the charge with respect to the allegation that 1199 SEIU 
violated its promise to hold a meeting to examine the disciplinary action taken against 
Case No. U-26736 - 3 -
him. Following the hearing, the Assistant Director issued a decision dismissing the 
remainder of Rowe's charge.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Rowe contends that the Assistant Director erred in dismissing 
the charge. He asserts that the Assistant Director should not have limited the issues to 
be determined at the hearing without providing him with an opportunity to conduct 
discovery. In addition, Rowe claims that the evidence in the record was sufficient to 
establish that 1199 SEIU violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act. 1199 SEIU supports 
the Assistant Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we deny Rowe's exceptions and affirm the Assistant Director's dismissal of the charge. 
FACTS 
At all times relevant, Rowe was a part-time employee at the Nursing Home in the 
1199 SEIU collective bargaining unit. Margaret Bachman (Bachman) is an 1199 SEIU 
vice president in the Albany area with duties that include representing members who 
work at the Nursing Home. Bachman supervises Phoebe Mackey (Mackey), who is 
employed as.an 1199 SEIU organizer and who is also responsible for representing 
Nursing Home employees. 
1
 41 PERB1J4569 (2008). 
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After Rowe returned to work in late 2005,2 the Nursing Home placed him on a 
new schedule and imposed restrictions on working overtime. 1199 SEIU filed a 
grievance on Rowe's behalf challenging the schedule change and overtime restrictions. 
Following a February 16, 2006 grievance hearing, where Rowe was represented by 
Bachman, his regular evening shift schedule was restored, the overtime restrictions 
were lifted and he was paid for not working a holiday. Rowe was dissatisfied with that 
result, however, believing that he was entitled to a substantial monetary settlement. 
With notice to Rowe, 1199 SEIU filed for a step three grievance hearing. 
In February 2006, 1199 SEIU filed another grievance on behalf of Rowe 
challenging a disciplinary action imposed by the Nursing Home with respect to Rowe's 
alleged violation of time and attendance rules.3 Bachman represented Rowe during the 
grievance hearing, but the grievance was denied. 
After Rowe returned to his regular schedule, he requested a change to that 
schedule because of a conflict caused by his educational course load. Following the 
Nursing Home's denial of his request, 1199 SEIU filed a grievance on Rowe's behalf. In 
advance of the grievance hearing, Bachman asked Rowe to bring documentation to 
demonstrate his course and examination schedule. Instead, Rowe appeared at the 
grievance hearing with a bag full of books, which he slammed on to a desk. During the 
2
 The precise circumstances of Rowe's absence from work in 2005 are neither clear 
from the record nor relevant to our determination. 
3
 The precise nature of the disciplinary action is unclear from the record. 
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grievance hearing, the Nursing Home agreed to the arrangement requested by Rowe, 
which included its agreement to assist him in finding other employees to cover Tuesday, 
Wednesday and Thursday evening shifts until he was able to resume his normal 
schedule. Bachman memorialized the terms of this resolution in a letter to the Nursing 
Home with a copy sent to Rowe. 
On June 6, 2006, Rowe left a lengthy voice message for Bachman about his 
treatment by the Nursing Home. The following day, he was terminated and on June 8, 
2006, 1199 SEIU filed a grievance challenging his termination. 
It is undisputed that during the course of 1199 SEIU's representation of Rowe, 
between January and June, 2006, Bachman received repeated telephone calls and 
lengthy messages from Rowe on 1199 SEIU's office telephone and Bachman's cellular 
telephone, including multiple calls in a single day. With the exception of his June 2006 
message with respect to his termination, Rowe was unable to identify the specific 
substance of his repeated messages. 
During her testimony, Bachman acknowledged that, due to other responsibilities, she 
was not able to respond to each and every call and message from Rowe. Rowe did not 
rebut her testimony about the enormous amount of time consumed by her numerous 
conversations and meetings with him. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with Rowe's exceptions challenging the Assistant Director's ruling that 
limited the issues to be determined at the hearing. Upon our review of the record, we 
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conclude that the Assistant Director's ruling was well within the considerable discretion 
granted in the processing of a charge.4 
As we stated in Dutchess Community College,5 when an ALJ finds fatal 
deficiencies in a pleading, following a party's clarification of its factual allegations, she or 
he may decline to further process the deficient component of the charge. In the present 
case, the Assistant Director correctly declined to further process Rowe's factual 
allegations, which were untimely and failed to set forth a comprehensible and 
cognizable claim under the Act. Furthermore, contrary to Rowe's argument, our Rules 
of Procedure do not permit the conduct of pre-hearing discovery. 
In addition, we deny Rowe's exceptions challenging the Assistant Director's 
dismissal of the remaining allegations of his charge. A motion to dismiss at the close of a 
charging party's case will be granted when the evidence produced by the charging party, 
after granting all reasonable inferences, is plainly insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
charge should be sustained.6 Upon our review of the record, and after granting all 
reasonable inferences to Rowe, we affirm the Assistant Director's conclusion that Rowe 
failed to present any material facts to support his claim that 1199 SEIU did not fulfill a 
purported promise to conduct a meeting to examine disciplinary action taken against him. 
4
 City of Elmira, 41 PERB 1J3018 (2008). 
5
 41 PERB H3029 (2008). 
6
 Lake Mohegan Fire Dist, 41 PERB P001 (2008). 
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Finally, we affirm the Assistant Director's dismissal of Rowe's remaining claim, 
which alleges that 1199 SEIU violated the Act when Bachman failed to respond to 
certain of Rowe's messages. 
An employee organization is obligated, in general, to respond to an inquiry from a 
unit member within a reasonable period of time. The failure to respond to inquiries 
which are redundant or onerous, however, will not generally constitute a violation of the 
Act.7 
In the present case, Rowe failed to identify the specific substance of his 
messages to Bachman with the exception of his call on June 6, 2006. Furthermore, the 
record demonstrates that during the applicable period Bachman was in regular contact 
with Rowe with respect to the workplace issues he raised in his telephone messages 
and represented him at various grievance hearings. Based upon the totality and 
regularity of Bachman's communications with Rowe, and the representation provided 
him, we conclude that 1199 SEIU did not violate §§209-a.2(a) and (c) when Bachman 
failed to respond to every specific message from Rowe, which were both redundant and 
onerous. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Rowe's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the Assistant Director. 
7
 UFT (Grassel), 23 PERB P042 (1990); DC 37 (Maltsev), 41 PERB 1J3022 (2008). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
4M^rm^-^ 
Jerome Lefjifowitz, Qfiairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. 06le, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the St. Paul Boulevard Fire 
District (District) and cross-exceptions by the St. Paul Boulevard Professional 
Firefighters Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) granting the unit placement petition filed by the Association to place the position 
of fire lieutenant in the Association's bargaining unit and dismissing the Association's 
petition for unit clarification.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the District asserts that the ALJ made certain factual findings 
inconsistent with the record and erred in her analysis of the relevant facts and law in 
1
 The Association filed a pleading labeled cross-exceptions stating that the Association 
fully supports the ALJ's decision. The pleading does not articulate any basis for 
reversing the ALJ's decision. Therefore, the Board has treated the pleading as a 
response to the District's exceptions rather than as cross-exceptions. See, PERB's 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), §§213.2 and 213.3. 
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placing the fire lieutenant in the Association's bargaining unit. It contends that the fire 
lieutenant does not share a community of interest with members of the Association's 
bargaining unit and that a conflict of interests exists requiring that the position be 
excluded from the bargaining unit. The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the District and Association, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision.2 They are repeated here 
only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
The District is a local governmental body governed and managed by an elected 
five member Board of Fire Commissioners (Commissioners) pursuant to New York law.3 
The responsibilities of the Commissioners include establishing a budget, collecting 
taxes, managing and controlling District property, hiring paid firefighters and imposing 
discipline.4 Each District Commissioner has specifically assigned areas of 
responsibilities. James Leusch (Leusch) is the Commissioner in charge of District 
personnel. The District maintains two fire houses, which are staffed by paid firefighters 
and voluntary firefighters. 
The Association is the recognized exclusive representative of a bargaining unit 
composed of 16 paid firefighters employed by the District.5 The District and Association 
2
 41 PERB H4014 (2008). 
3
 See, Town Law §170, et seq. 
4
 See, Town Law §§176, 176(10), (11), (11-c), (18-a) and (19). 
5
 In addition, the District has 67 volunteer firefighters who are represented by a separate 
not-for-profit organization, the St. Paul Boulevard Fire Association, which maintains an 
office at a District Fire House. The District's volunteers include a fire chief, assistant 
chief, three captains and six lieutenants. 
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are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) which expires on 
December 31, 2009. 
Under the agreement, firefighters are divided into four groups, with each group 
working two ten-hour day shifts and two 14-hour night shifts followed by four days off. 
The minimum salary for a firefighter under the agreement is $30,800, with the maximum 
base salary ranging from $56,582 to $60,582. Firefighters are entitled to increments, 
longevity pay and a $1,500 annual payment for obtaining and sustaining certification as 
an emergency medical technician (EMT). Firefighters earn varying amounts of vacation 
leave depending on their years of service. The agreement places restrictions on the 
use of such leave during the summer months, and the Commissioner in charge of 
personnel has sole authority to approve leave requests for less than a full shift.6 
In 2007, the District created a new paid fire lieutenant position to provide day-to-
day supervision of paid firefighters in responding to fires and emergencies and to 
oversee their training. In February, 2007, the District promoted Timothy Kohlmeier 
(Kohlmeier) from a paid District firefighter to the new fire lieutenant position. Prior to his 
promotion, Kohlmeier was paid a stipend to train District paid and volunteer firefighters 
consistent with his certification as the municipal training officer. 
During his testimony, Leusch testified that the Commissioners anticipated the fire 
lieutenant to function as a filter by responding to minor firehouse and equipment 
problems and by referring other problems to the appropriate Commissioner.7 Similarly, 
6
 Joint Exhibit 1, Article XIV and XV. 
7
 Transcript, pp. 23-24. 
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Kohlmeier testified that following his promotion he was advised by the Commissioners 
to use his best judgment in handling certain issues but to refer other issues to them.8 
The District and Kohlmeier entered into a written agreement providing that all of 
the terms and conditions in the District - Association agreement are applicable to 
Kohlmeier in his new position with four exceptions: the maximum base salary for his 
position would be $66,582 in 2007, $68,582 in 2008 and $70,582 in 2009; he would 
work 40 hours per week and an additional 100 hours per year for meetings and training; 
he would be entitled to two weeks of vacation leave after his first year, three weeks of 
vacation after 10 years and five weeks of vacation after 20 years; and his vacation leave 
and longevity payments would be calculated based on his original date of hire.9 
In his first year as fire lieutenant, Kohlmeier shared a locked office with the St. 
Paul Boulevard Fire Association and the volunteers it represents until that organization 
determined it wanted its own office.10 In the office, Kohlmeier maintains a locked filing 
cabinet which contains files and personal notes with respect to paid and volunteer 
firefighters. In addition, the District provides him with a private telephone line, a 
computer and a cell phone. 
Kohlmeier works four ten-hour shifts per week. His schedule can be modified 
only with the permission of Leusch, with whom he interacts on a daily basis. Between 
shifts, Kohlmeier meets with the firefighters to assign tasks to be performed by the 
incoming shift. In general, Kohlmeier does not give specific work assignments to 
individual firefighters, but he has the discretion to change an assignment, if necessary. 
8
 Transcript, p. 66. 
9
 Joint Exhibit 2. 
10
 Transcript, pp. 38-39. The organization moved from the office approximately one 
week prior to the hearing before the ALJ, but the organization's officers continue to have 
access to the office. Transcript, p. 38. 
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Kohlmeier testified that he, along with the paid firefighters, are granted the discretion to 
deviate or modify standard operating procedures (SOPs) based on experience and 
judgment in responding to a situation. Although Kohlmeier can not create or change 
District policies, SOPs or rules and regulations, he has supervisory responsibilities with 
respect to compliance with District policies, rules and regulations. 
Kohlmeier attends Commissioner meetings to answer questions but does not 
attend executive sessions when personnel matters are discussed. Since his promotion, 
Kohlmeier has participated in one set of candidate interviews, along with the 
Commissioners, to fill a vacant paid firefighter position and made a recommendation to 
the Commissioners with respect to that vacancy. The position was filled following 
deliberations by the Commissioners in which Kohlmeier did not participate. 
Kohlmeier does not conduct evaluations of paid firefighters, and testified that he 
is unaware whether he has that authority. He testified that he would seek Leusch's 
opinion before initiating any form of evaluation procedure. 
Finally, Kohlmeier testified that, after his promotion, Leusch and he responded to 
an unspecified personnel matter involving a paid firefighter. After Kohlmeier reported 
certain information to Leusch, Leusch decided that the issue should be investigated and 
addressed by both of them. Thereafter, they met with the firefighter and following that 
meeting Leusch and Kohlmeier collectively decided on an unspecified outcome. 
DISCUSSION 
We commence our discussion with the District's exceptions challenging 
purported errors of fact made by the ALJ with respect to Kohlmeier's consultation with 
Commissioners, the nature of Kohlmeier's assignment of work to paid firefighters and 
the extent of his involvement in the hiring of firefighters. Following our review of the 
record, we deny the District's exceptions challenging those findings of fact. 
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According to Leusch, Kohlmeier is expected to respond to minor problems but to 
refer other problems to the Commissioners. In addition, Kohlmeier testified that it is his 
practice to assign tasks to an entire shift, rather than individual firefighters, with the 
expectation that the shift will determine how to complete the tasks. Finally, although 
Kohlmeier participated in a single set of interviews for a paid firefighter vacancy, he 
admitted that the Commissioners made the decision to hire following their deliberations 
in which he took no part. 
Next, we turn to the District's exceptions challenging the ALJ's legal conclusion 
that the fire lieutenant shares a community of interest with the paid firefighters and her 
related conclusion that placing the position in the unit would not create a conflict of 
interests that outweighs other facts supporting the finding of a community of interest. 
In sharp contrast to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),11 
the Act does not exclude supervisors from the statutory rights to organization and 
representation, nor does the Act define what constitutes a supervisor.12 Under the Act, 
in determining whether an unrepresented supervisor should be placed in a bargaining 
unit of rank-and-file employees, the Board will apply the community of interest and 
administrative convenience standards set forth in §207.1 of the Act, with the community 
of interest given predominant consideration.13 
11
 29 USC §§152(3) and (11). 
12
 State of New York (Div of State Police), 1 PERB P99.32 (1968); Johnson City Cent 
Sch Dist, 1 PERB 1J399.55 (1968); Uniondale Union Free Sch Dist, 21 PERB 1J3060 
(1988), app withdrawn, 23 PERB 1J7004 (2d Dept 1990) nor; County of Genesee, 29 
PERB P068 (1996); New York Power Authority, 38 PERB 1J3003 (2005). 
13
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo, 14 PERB P051 (1981); City 
of Rye, 33 PERB P035 (2000); NYCTA, 36 PERB 1J3038 (2003). 
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The factors that are considered in determining whether a community of interest 
exists include the similarity of the terms and conditions of employment, shared mission 
and duties, and common work location.14 The existence of disparities in benefits is not 
a sufficient basis for the exclusion of an unrepresented employee when other facts, 
such as shared duties and responsibilities, establish a community of interest.15 When 
the uniting question involves an unrepresented supervisor, the Board also examines 
whether the extent and nature of the assigned supervisory functions create a conflict of 
interests, thereby outweighing other facts that may support inclusion.16 Among the 
significant supervisory duties that may indicate such a conflict of interests is the 
authority to impose discipline, initiate disciplinary procedures, conduct formal 
evaluations, render first step decisions on contract grievances and provide supervision 
over day-to-day operations. 
Kohlmeier and paid firefighters share the same work location, as well as the 
same primary mission and duties: to prevent, control and extinguish fires. They are 
responsible for responding to fire alarms and emergency calls and maintaining the 
District's equipment and property. With a few exceptions, Kohlmeier's terms and 
conditions of employment are set by the terms of the District - Association agreement. 
While Kohlmeier's salary is higher than the maximum base salary for paid firefighters, 
he is entitled to the same contractual longevity pay based on his original date of hire as 
14
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo, supra note 13; Monroe #1 
BOCES, 39 PERB 1J3024 (2006); Regional Transit Service, Inc., 39 PERB H3027 
(2006). 
15
 Unatego Cent Sch Dist; 15 PERB 1J3097 (1982); County of Genesee, supra, note 12. 
16
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo, supra note 13; County of 
Genesee, supra note 12; City of Rye, supra note 13; New York Power Authority, supra 
note 12. 
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a paid firefighter as well as the annual payment if he maintains an EMT certification. In 
addition, Kohlmeier's higher salary is inclusive of the extra stipend he formerly received 
as a paid firefighter for his training duties. Although Kohlmeier's work schedule and 
vacation rights may be different from the paid firefighters, Leusch has supervisory 
responsibilities over the work and vacation schedules of Kohlmeier and the paid 
firefighters. 
We do not find Kohlmeier's use of an office, a computer, filing cabinets and a 
District cell phone to be a sufficient basis for excluding his position from the bargaining 
unit. With respect to the office, the record establishes that Kohlmeier shared it with the 
St. Paul Boulevard Fire Association and that organization's officers continue to have 
access to the office. In addition, Kohlmeier's maintenance of files and personal notes in 
filing cabinets does not demonstrate a distinction in terms and conditions of employment 
warranting exclusion. 
Based upon the evidence in the record before us, we conclude that Kohlmeier 
does not have sufficient supervisory duties and responsibilities to demonstrate a conflict 
of interests requiring the position of fire lieutenant to be excluded from the unit. Unlike 
the facts in City of Rye,17 the record establishes that Kohlmeier does not have the 
authority to hire, impose discipline, initiate disciplinary procedures, conduct formal 
evaluations or determine grievances on behalf of the District. Although he participated 
in a single set of interviews to fill a vacancy, the Commissioners made the decision to 
hire. His participation, along with Leusch, in the investigation and resolution of the 
personnel matter does not indicate sufficient supervisory responsibilities to establish a 
conflict. In fact, the evidence establishes that Leusch made the decision to commence 
the investigation. Finally, Kohlmeier's supervision over day-to-day operations is subject 
17
 Supra note 13. 
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to supervision by Leusch, with whom he speaks to daily, and Kohlmeier is expected to 
refer all but minor problems to the appropriate Commissioner. 
We accordingly affirm the decision of the ALJ that it is appropriate to place the 
title of fire lieutenant in the Association's unit. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Association's unit placement petition is 
granted. 
DATED: June 9, 2009 
Albany, New York 
•J Jerome Lefk^bwite^e^airman 
f/. 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S.^Cble, Member 
